PRESIDENT NIXON EXAMINES THE SPACE SHUTTLE CONCEPT
President Richard M. Nixon and Dr. James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, discuss the proposed Space Shuttle vehicle in San Clemente, California, on January 5, 1972. (Photo Courtesy NASA)
John Logsdon's new book shows how the post-Apollo era was
defined by Richard Nixon
In 1969, the Apollo 11 mission successfully met President
John F. Kennedy’s challenge to land a man on the Moon and return him safely to Earth
within the decade. The end of the Moon race raised the question: what, if
anything, was next for NASA? It would be answered by Richard Nixon's
Administration, and the decisions they made altered the nation's relationship
with its space program forever.
On September 22, I attended a talk by George Washington
University Professor Emeritus and Planetary Society Board Member John Logsdon
at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. Professor Logsdon
spoke about Richard Nixon's space legacy and previewed his upcoming book titled After
Apollo: Richard Nixon and the American Space Program, which was due for
release by Palgrave-MacMillan in March 2015.
Professor Logsdon spent the last several years poring
through archival materials and conducting interviews to unveil a detailed account
of the activities in President Richard Nixon’s White House, which certainly
makes for a fascinating story. But Logsdon takes the tale a step further, using
his extensive knowledge of space policy and many years of experience in the
space policy community to examine the implications of the Nixon
Administration’s decisions.
The Nixon Space Doctrine
Professor Logsdon offers the provocative argument that
President Nixon had a more lasting impact on NASA than John F. Kennedy, when
considered over the longer history of the agency. Logsdon cites a statement
issued by President Nixon on March 7, 1970, as the best illustration of Nixon’s
“Space Doctrine,” suggesting that the tenets of this doctrine have remained the
core of U.S. space policy to date.
Pondering the future of NASA and its sustainability,
Nixon said, “We must think of [space activities] as part of a continuing
process… and not as a series of separate leaps, each requiring a massive
concentration of energy. Space expenditures must take their proper place within
a rigorous system of national priorities. … What we do in space from here on in
must become a normal and regular part of our national life and must therefore
be planned in conjunction with all of the other undertakings which are
important to us.”
JASON CALLAHAN AND JOHN LOGSDON
It's a little dark, but this is the author (left) with
George Washington University Professor Emeritus and Planetary Society Board
Member John Logsdon, standing in front of the original Robert McCall painting
of the space station for the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey, located in the
National Air and Space Museum conference room.
Logsdon points to three key decisions Nixon made
regarding the U.S. space program, which had long-term consequences for NASA.
The three decisions were:
- To
treat the space program as one area of domestic policy competing with
other concerns, not as a privileged activity
- To
lower U.S. ambitions in space by ending human spaceflight beyond low Earth
orbit for the foreseeable future and not embark on another space goal
requiring a massive investment similar to Apollo
- To
build NASA’s post-Apollo program around the space shuttle without
establishing a specific goal or long-term strategy the shuttle would
support
Professor Logsdon says that Nixon’s lasting imprint on
the space program was an end to human exploration of space beyond low Earth
orbit in the twentieth century, and he sees the Nixon Space Doctrine and more
ambitious human space exploration as incompatible. Under Nixon, NASA became just
another domestic program, and the agency’s budget decreased even as it retained
ambitious goals. During this time, however, NASA’s efforts did include
increased international participation in U.S. human spaceflight programs.
Interesting Points
Professor Logsdon briefly described the events of Nixon’s
presidency as they related to space, revealing many fascinating anecdotes. I
have included a few interesting tidbits, though there are plenty more in the
book:
- Nixon
saw the Apollo 11 mission as an opportunity to tie achievements in space
to his foreign policy goals, which he gave much higher priority. He made a
great effort to ensure he was fully identified with the mission and its
success, and he never once mentioned John F. Kennedy in connection with Apollo.
- Nixon
wanted former astronaut Frank Borman, commander of Apollo 8, to be the
next NASA Administrator, but he had to settle for NASA Deputy
Administrator Tom Paine.
- Nixon’s
1971 budget included a 10 percent reduction for NASA, so the agency was
not rewarded for the success of Apollo 11.
- Nixon
supported increased international cooperation in space, but he thought
that should primarily mean flying foreign astronauts on U.S. space craft,
particularly German, Japanese, British, and French astronauts. NASA leadership
anticipated that international cooperation would include hardware
contributions from other nations.
- Nixon
wanted to change NASA into an applied technology development agency, but
the effort failed.
- Nixon
is often blamed for the cancellation of the final two planned Apollo
missions, but Logsdon emphasizes that NASA Administrator Tom Paine agreed
to give up the Saturn V in order to free up resources in the budget for
the shuttle and station programs. It was NASA that also chose to cancel
the last two Apollo flights to channel resources to the space shuttle
program.
- Nixon
was the first U.S. President to see a human space launch (Apollo 12).
- Nixon
was apparently deeply affected by the near tragic events of Apollo 13, and
felt very connected to the crew during their ordeal. As a result, Nixon
proposed to cancel Apollo 16 and 17 ahead of the 1972 election, for fear
that something could go wrong with one of the missions and impact his
re-election bid.
- In
December 1972, as Apollo 17 was returning to Earth, Nixon issued a
statement saying, “This may be the last time in this century that men will
walk on the Moon.”
Professor Logsdon outlined a number of conclusions
regarding the Nixon Administration’s choices for the U.S. space program, which
are fully discussed in his book. In one of his more poignant observations, he
noted:
“One can argue that Nixon made a major policy
mistake in mandating that the space program should be treated as just one of
many domestic government programs competing for limited resources.
Advocates for the last 40+ years have called for NASA budget increases and for
treating the space program as ‘special.’ But it is also possible to argue that
Nixon’s decision that U.S. space ambitions should be adjusted to the funds made
available through the normal policy process was a valid reading of public
preferences, and there were and still are no countervailing public policy
reasons to reject those preferences. As his young assistant Tom Whitehead
commented, ‘no compelling reason to push space was ever presented to the White
House by NASA or anyone else.’ What has happened is the least desirable outcome
- for more than 40 years there has been a mismatch between space ambitions and
the resources provided to achieve them.”
In the question and answer portion of the talk, an
audience member asked Logsdon what he saw as the biggest problem with the human
space flight program today.
He referenced the recent report “Pathways
to Exploration” by the National Research Council on the human spaceflight
program, saying that people tend to focus on Chapter Four which assesses the
various technical pathways to get (eventually) to Mars, while ignoring Chapters
Two and Three which show that there is no compelling public support for a human
mission to Mars.
Marcia Smith, former director of the Space Studies Board and
publisher of SpacePolicyOnline.com,
pointed out that there is also no compelling resistance to a human Mars
mission. Logsdon agreed, and said that a lack of a public opinion on the matter
meant that the only way out of the current situation is through Presidential
leadership.
Professor Logsdon is Professor Emeritus and founder of
the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. His previous
book, John
F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon , met with rave
reviews, and in his talk he said he plans to complete his “trilogy” with a book
on the Ronald Reagan Administration’s impact on the U.S. space program.
I’d
like to thank him for providing very timely corrections to this post, and for
sending me a copy of his slides from the International
Astronautical Congress the same day he presented there. As a side
note, he mentioned to me that the Planetary Society is “here in force” at the
IAC!
Professor Logsdon’s talk was the 13th presentation of
the Space Policy and History Forum organized by Dr. Roger Launius,
associate director of the National Air and Space Museum, and Dr. Nathan Bridges
of the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory. If you find
yourself in the Washington, D.C. area and are interested in attending one of
the forums, keep an eye on Dr.
Launius’ blog for announcements of upcoming events (and tons of other
interesting information).
ROGER LAUNIUS AND JOHN LOGSDON
National Air and Space Museum Associate Director Dr.
Roger Launius (left) and Professor John Logsdon at the 13th Space Policy and
History Forum, at which Professor Logsdon was the featured speaker.
Jason
Callahan Is a former Space Policy Advisor for The
Planetary Society.
